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Theories of Wage Rigidity
ABSTRACT
This paper considers two sets of theories attempting to explain
wage rigidities and unemployment: implicit contract theory and the
efficiency wage theory. The basic thesis of the paper Is that the
formerset of theories do not provide a convincing explanation of the
kind of wage rigidity which is associated with cyclical unemployment,
whilethe latter theories do. Several of the more recent versions of
implicit contract theory are considered: implicit contracts with
asymmetric information may give rise to over employment rather than
underemployment, and the forms of contracts to be expected, were
asymmetric information considerations paramount, are not observed.
Other versions of the asymmetric information implicit contract model,
explicitly long term in nature, may give rise to full employment. One
version of implicit contract theory which does give rise to lay—offs
arises when search is costly and cannot be monitored. But even this
extension does not explain certain important features of observed
patterns of unemployment.
In contrast, the efficiency wage models not only provide an
explanation of the existence of unemployment equilibrium in competitive
economies, but they also provide part of the explanation of the observed
patterns of unemployment. They also explain why different firms may pay
similar workers different wages, why wages may be sticky, why firms may
not loose much if they fail to adjust their wages, and why, when they
adjust their wages optimally, they adjust them slowly.
The policy implications of the efficiency wage model are markedly
different from those of models in which wages are absolutely rigid as
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It is widely recognized that the assumption that wages are rigid is
central to Keynes' explanation of the persistence of unemployment.1
Indeed, in the fixed price (temporary equilibrium) models, which are
currently so much in fashion in Europe, it is the rigidity of wages and
prices which provides the sole explanation for unemployment in the
economy.2
These theories have, however, simply assumed that wages and prices are
rigid; they have not attempted to explain the rigidity. This has left
'Paper prepared for presentation at a conference on Keynes' Economic
Legacy University of Delaware, January 12—13, 19811. Financial support
from the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. This
paper was completed while I was a Visiting Fellow at the Hoover
Institution, Stanford.I am indebted to R. Arnott, C. Azariadis, G.
Akerlof, J. Butkiewicz, Russell Cooper, 0. Hart, S. Grossman, B.
Greenwald, A. Hosios, John Pencavel, A. Weiss, J. Yellen, and D. Newbery
for helpful discussions.
1We shall follow the well honored tradition in Keynesian' analysis of
obfuscating whether it is the rigidity in real or nominal wages which is
crucial for the analysis. Mostofthe theories that we discuss in this
paper are concerned with rigidities in real wages. In section II we
discuss alternative explanations of the rigidity of nominal wages.
2Among recent expositions include two booksby Malinvaud (1977, 1980),
and one by Grandmont (1982). Earlier studies included those by Solow
and Stiglitz (1967) and Barro and Grossman (1971). Although most
studies in this tradition place primary emphasis on the rigidity of
wages and prices, other rigities may give rise to unemployment. For
instance, Neary and Stiglitz (1983) analyze the consequences of
rigidities in the rate of interest.—2—
these models open to charges of adhocery and inconsistency: why should
firms which are assumed to act in such a rational, profit maximizing,
competitive manner with respect to production and employment decisions,
not act in a similarly rational, profit maximizing, competitive manner
when it comes to decisions concerning wage and price determination?
Worse still, the models may not provide an adequate basis for policy
analysis: even it wage and prices are fixed in the very short run, might
they not be affected by policies, such as the level of unemployment
compensation?
In this paper, I wish to discuss two sets of theories which attempt
to explain the observed rigidities in wages.3 The first, which I shall
refer to generically as "implicit contract theories," explain wage
rigidity as a consequence of implicit insurance provided to risk averse
employees by their employers. The second I shall refer to generically
as "efficiency wage" theories; these hold that workers' productivity
depends on the wage that they are paid; firms may not lower wages, even
in the presence of unemployment, because to do so would lower the
productivity of their labor force. The basic thesis of this paper is
that the former set of theories do not provide a convincing explanation
of the kind of wage rigidity which is associated with cyclical
unemployment, while the latter theories do.4
Our discussion is not intended to be a survey of what have developed
into large literatures, but rather to provide a critical assessment of
3Elsewhere, I have addressed thequestion of price rigidity. (Stiglltz
(19810).
4As I notebelow, the two theories are not mutually inconsistent: a
full theory will need to incorporate elements of both approaches.—3—
the central issues associated with each of the theories.
1. What It is that is to be Explained.
A theory of unemployment must explain not only the level of
unemployment, but its formandcomposition. For instance, workers may
be put on short weeks as well as laid off. If individuals have
quasi—concave indifference curves, they prefer work sharing to having
some probability of working a full week, and some probability of not
working at all.
There are two easy explanations of the prevalence of lay offs in
the US (in Europe, work sharing seems to be more common). The first has
to do with unemployment compensation: an individual who is an halt time
cannot collect the public subsidy associated with unemployment
compensation. There are two basic objections to this "explanation":
First, given the limitation on the number of weeks which individuals can
collect unemployment compensation (and the fact that there is only a one
week waiting period for collecting it) firms should rotate individuals
who are laid off. The argument for job rotation is even more compelling
if the marginal utility of leisure diminishes significantly, the longer
the individual is unemployed.5 Moreover, the phenomenon of unemployment
pre—dated the extensive provision of unemployment insurance factors.
Another explanation for lay—of'fs is that technologies require
individuals to work 8 hour days, can similarly be dismissed: in most
5There is,moreover, considerable evidence that being without work for
an extended period of time is extremely disruptive to the individual and
his family; the loss of income is only partially responsible; the loss
of sense of worth from not being gainfully employed, the loss of respect
from others, and the fear of this loss, are probably even more
important. Beyond somepoint,leisure appears to have negative value.—Il —
productionjobs, the economies of time—scale seldom extend beyond the
day, and certainly not beyond the week or month.
It is not, however, enough to explain why firms might lay off
individuals: one must explain why other firms do not rehire them.
Unemployment arises when layoffs exceed hires. Most of the implicit
contract theories have called themselves theories of unemployment simply
by assuming that there is no labor mobility; in that case, obviously,
any worker who is laid off is unemployed. But even in the midst of the
Great Depression, there was a high job accession rate ——nothigh enough
to compensate for the even higher lay off rate. Unemployment cannot be
explained on the basis of the behavior of a single firm, but only by the
analysis of the market as a whole. Any implicit contract theory which
purports to explain unemployment must, thus, be a part of a theory of
the market.
Finally, any theory should be able to explain not only why certain
shocks give rise to unemployment (an increase In lay offs relative to
hires), but also why the unemployment should be concentrated within
certain parts of the labor force.
Furthermore, any theory which we construct should be consistent
with certain other characteristics of economic fluctuations: among these
are (a) those who are unemployed often look very much like those who are
employed; individuals with similar qualifications seem to be treated
very differently; and (b) those who are unemployed are, for the most
part, unhappier than those who remain employed. For the most part,
individuals prefer not to be layed off, rather than to be layed off.6
6As we notebelow, there are a few instances where this is not true.-5-
Of course,evenwere we able to explain why there are lay—oils, and
why those layed of I arenotrehired, we would not have a complete
explanation of economic fluctuations. We would still need to explain
what are the sources of the disturbances to the economy. Ourtask,here
is the more limited one of explaining why certain shocks might lead to
unemployment, why the adjustment mechanisms, which in traditional
competitive analysis lead the economy to full employment7 seems to fail
so frequently.
I
Implicit Contract Theories of Wage Rigidity
1. The Basic Theory8
The basic hypothesis of implicit contract theory is.that workers
are risk averse, and have limited access to capital markets. They would
like to obtain insurance against flubtuations in their income. They
cannot obtain such insurance from conventional insurance companies;9
TVariations in economic circumstances may lead to variations in hours
worked,or to some individuals deciding not to seek work, even in a
Walrasian economy. We wish to explain why it appears to be the case
that variations in employment are greater than they would in a Walrasian
equilibrium.
8The standard references for the Implicit Contract Theory are Azariadis
(1975),Gordon(19711), and Bailey (197E. For two recent surveys, see
C. Azariadis (1979) and C. Azariadis and Stiglitz (1983).
9Most of the literature has not addressed the question of why
individuals cannot or do not purchase wage and/or employment insurance
companies. Arnott, Hosios, and Stiglitz (1983) provide a brief
discussion; noting the central problems of moral hazard (to be discussed
below), they observe that the employer has an informational advantage
over other potential suppliers of insurance.
Similarly the standard implicit contract models do not provide a
(Footnote continued)—6—
but their employers are less risk averse and have greater access to the
capital market than they do. As a result, employers provide some form
of wage and employment insurance as part of the employment package. To
putit another way, a firm which offered such insurance as part of its
employmentpackage would be able to attract workers at a lower (average)
wage than a firm which did not provide such insurance.
1.1 Simple Implicit Contract Theory May Explain Wage RLgidities
But Not Unemployment
If all states of nature are observable (and verifiable), then the
implicit contract would specify the amount of labor and the wage to be
paid in each state. In such circumstances, though there may be
relatively little fluctuations in wage (incomes), the implicit contract
would not give rise to unemployment: the marginal rate of substitution
of each individual between income and leisure would be equal to the
marginal rate of transformation, and there would be no lay—offs.10
Recall our original objective was to find an explanation of wage
rigidity which could help explain unemployment; the implicit contract
theory may provide us some insights into the movement of wages, but (at
9(continued)
good explanation of why access to the credit market is limited, or why
it is more limited for individuals than for firms. One explanation of
credit rationing in competitive markets with imperfect information has
recently been provided by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, 1983). Because the
firm is more informed about its employees' future income potential than,
say, a bank, it has a natural advantage in serving as an intermediary in
the provision of (possibly implicit) credit.
10Except if some individual would have remained voluntarilyunemployed
in the corresponding Walrasian equilibrium, because his marginal role of
substitution exceeded his marginal rate of transformation at zero work.'-7—
least in the simple version) does not explain movements in employment.11
This can be seen most easily if we think of the firm as having two
departments, an itLurance department and a production department. The
production department pays workers the ordinary "Walrasian" (spot)
wages, which may fluctuate considerably. The worker then takes this
wage to the insurance department; the insurance department agrees to
supplement his income in bad states, in return for a premium (payable
only in good states.) This results in the individual's take home pay
(his wage plus or minus payments to the insurance company) varying much
less than his Walrasian wage. What we observe, of course, is the take
home pay; butwhat enters into the analysis of the production decision
is the Walrasian (shadow or spot) wage; and since the Wairasian wage is
perfectly flexible, there is no unemployment.
(If the marginal rate of substitution was less than the marginal
rate of transformation in some states of nature, so that the amount
individuals required to be compensated for an increase in work by an
hour was less than the value of the extra amount of output •they
produced, then it would pay the finn to ask the worker to work the
additional hour, and increase his pay accordingly; if the individual is
risk averse, and the utility function is separable in consumption and
leisure, he will increase his take—home pay equally in all states;12
11Even its implications for the movements inreal wages may not be
totally convincing. If workers' utility functions are separable in
consumption and leisure (a case we shall discuss at greater length
below), and if workers' have no access to the capital market (so
consumption and income at each date are identical), then consumption of
all those retained throughout the business cycle should be constant,
i.e. real wages should move inversely to the number of hours worked. If
leisure and consumption are complements, real wages should increase even
more in a recession.—8—
more generally, the increase in pay will be spread among states to
equate his marginal utility of income.)13
The result that implicit contracts do not give rise to unemployment
fluctuations4 should not come as asurprise: it has long been
recognized that insurance contracts (and recall, implicit contracts are
really nothing more than insurance contracts provided by the employer)
improve the functioning of competitive economies.
Indeed, one of the basic results of Arrow and Debreu was to show
that a competitive economy would be pareto efficient if there were a
complete set of risk markets. Subsequently, Borch showed that the
absence of insurance markets may make all individuals worse off.15
1.2 Market Equilibrium Is Not Constrained Pareto Efficient
More relevant for our purpose is the question of the consequences
of providing employment related insurance in economies in which there
are not a complete set of insurance contracts. As we have aruged, under
the conditions given above, such implicit contracts will be associated
12That is, the optimal contracts entailsequal pay in all states;
without separability the level of pay depends on the level of work in
each state.
13Assuming that the firmisrisk neutral.
11This view of the implicitcontract, and the corresponding implication
that Implicit contract theory did not give rise to unemployment, was set
forth in Stiglitz (1978). See also Azarladis and Stiglitz (1983) and
Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980).
15For general results on the constrainedinefficiency of competitive
economies with an incomplete set of markets, see Greenwald and Stiglitz
(1983), Hart (1975), Newbery and Stiglitz (1981,1982) and Stiglitz
(1973,1982); for a proof that competitive economies with implicit wage
contracts are inefficient, see Mewbery and Stiglitz (1983).—9—
with full employment (the marginal rate of substitution of each
individual is equal to the marginal rate of transformation); they are
"locally" efficient, in the sense that, given the distribution of
prices, employer's expected profits (or expected utility of profits) is
maximized, subject to the constraint that workers obtain a particular
level of expected utility. But the economy is not a constrained pareto
optimum; that is, given the limited set of insurance markets, there are
feasible interventions on the part of government (say taxes and
subsidies, on employment or output) which will make some individuals
better off without making others worse off. (Newbery and Stiglitz
(1983)).
Our interest here, however, is more in the descriptive implication
of implicit contracts than its welfare consequences. But again, we
would have thought that, particularly if individuals have limited access
to the capital market, and their consumption is constrained by this,
that the provision of employment related insurance would have smoothed
outvariations in consumption, and hence would serve to dampen, rather
than to exacerbate, the cyclical fluctuations ofthe ecomony.
There have been several attempts to modify and extend Implicit
Contract Theory, to derive conditions under which such contracts might
give rise to unemployment.
1.3 Unemployment Compensation and Voluntary Unemployment
The first, and most obvious, is a consequence of our system of
unemployment compensation: given that this is provided not on an
actuarially sound basis, it pays firms to devise employment strategies
to take advantage of the public subsidies. In the limiting case where—10--
the payments of the firmarenot related at all to the experience of its
employees, the finn would lay off workers all states of' the world in
which worker's productivity is sufficiently low. The precise condition
depends on whether firms supplement the unemployment compensation of
individuals. Then the layed—off workers are, in a sense, all
voluntarily unemployed provided that leisure is normal: the level of
utility that they get from leisure together with the unemployment
compensation exceeds the level of utility they would have obtained if
they worked. (See Appendix A). Most (or at least many) of those who
are classified as unemployed do not fall within this category; and the
problems of unemployment with which we are concerned here antedated the
spread of unemployment compensation and welfare systems with more than
subsistence levelofpayments.
Further evidence that there is more at issue is provided by the
fact that the pattern of unemployment does not conform to that which
would arise if lay—offs were simply a result of firms attempting to take
advantage of unemployment compensation. In particular, one would expect
to see more extensive use of job rotation, ensuring that no individual
exhausts his unemployment benefits.
1.11 The Theory of Insurance and Implicit Contracts
A morefundamentalapproach is to ask, what are the generic
problems associated with insurance contracts, and implicit insurance
contracts in particular, and do any of these problems manifest
themselves as what might look like involuntary unemployment.
FLare are at least six problems which are relevant for our
analysis:—11—•
(a) The observability problem: the insurance contractcan only
cover events which are observable to the insurance company.
(b) The verifiability problem: even if the event can be
observed, to enforce a contract through legal means requires
that a third, outside party must be able to verify its
existence.
This is an example of a wider class of problems which werefer
to generically as:
Cc) The enforcement problem. Whenever the "trade" between two
individuals does take place simultaneously, there must be some
method of ensuring that the party which has agreed to make the
later delivery lives up to his promise. This problem may be
particularly acute, as we shall see, with implicit contracts.
Cd) The complexity problem. Any insurance contract usually
covers not a single event (state of' nature) but a range of
events; writing contracts so that each contigency which should
be distinguished from other contingencies is so distinguishedis
a difficult if not impossible task. Usually, severaldifferent
contingencies are covered by the same set of clauses, though in
the absence of "transactions costs" each would be treated
differently.
Ce) The moral hazard problem. The provision of insurance often
affects the likelihood that the insured against event occurs.
To avoid the resulting inefficiencies, (individual3 failing to
16A closely related pràblem is referred to as the Valuation problem:
even when it is possible to ascertain that some losshasoccured,it may
bedifficult to assess its magnitude.—12—
take due care against theoccurrence of the accident) insurance
firms frequently insist onco—insurance clauses.
(f) The adverse selectionproblem. When a group of individuals
are Offered a given insurance
policy, those among the group with
the highest (subjective)probability of the occurrence of the
accident are most likely to purchasethe policy. The insurance
firm may attempt to designcontracts which separate low risk
individuals from high riskindividuals, e.g. by offering
policies with high deductibijities, limitedcoverage, etc.
Each of these problems has itsmanifestation in the provision of
employment related insurance (Implicit
contracts.) Surprisingly, it is
only the first of these problems which
has received much attention in
the literature; and it doesnot, in my view, provide a convincing
explanation of unemployment.
3. The Observability Problem.1?
The contracts we described abovehad hours and wages (income)
dependingon the state of nature, which weassumed was observable to
both the firmand theworkers. What happens ifthestate of nature is
observableto the firm, but not to theworker?
The firm wilY, not, ingeneral, have the incentive to tell the
T7lmplicit contractswith asymmetric and incompleteinformation have been analyzed by (among others)Arnott, Hosios, and Stiglitz (1980),
Azariadis (1933). Chari (1983),Cooper (1981), Green and Kahn (1983), Grossman and Hart (1981, 1983),
Grossman, Hart, and Maskin (1983), and Hart (1983). For a partialsurvey, see Azariadis and Stiglitz, (1983).—1 3—
truth.Consider the case discussed earlier, where individuals have
utility functions which are separable in consumptionand leisure. The
optimal contract entailed equating consumptionin all states, but
varying hours, with the individual working morehours in the bad state
than in the good. Clearly, the firm has anincentive to announce that
it is the good state, regardless of what the true stateis: what it
pays the workers is the same, but theamount of work it extracts from
them is greater in the good state.
It is easy, however, to design a contract which inducesthe (inn to
tell the truth. We restrict the choices of the firm:if it announces
that it is a good state, we compel it to make the workers work morethan
they would in the Walrasian perfect informationequilibrium and to pay
their workers more. The extra output produced by a firmin the good
state is much larger than that produced by one in the bad;for firms in
the good state, the extra output is enough to compensatefor the
increased wages which they pay: for firms in the bad state,the extra
output is not enough to compensate for theincreased wages they would
have to pay if they falsely announced it was a goodstate. Such a
contrat introduces two inefficiencies relative to thefirst best
contract (with perfect information.) Workers have to bear risks,and in
the good state there is over—employment.
Assume, in contrast, that firms are very risk averse,and
individuals are risk neutral. Then the optimal contractwould entail
workers providing insurance to the firm; in the bad state, theywould
accept a wage below their marginal product,while in the good state,
they would be paid more than their marginal product.In that case,
firms might have an incentive to announce that itis a bad state, to get—ill—
workers to accept a low wage, when in fact it isa good state. Again,
firms can be induced to tell the truthby restricting their choices.
Now, we curtail the amount of employment whichthey can undertake in the
bad state, relative to the Walrasianequilibrium. The "cost" of this
reduction is greater in the good state than inthe bad; indeed, if we
curtail the maximum level of employment whichwe allow enough, the loss
in profits in the good state exceeds thegains that it obtains from
having lower wages, and thus it will pay the firm totell the truth.
Thus, the "theory" may explain either underor over employment.
Which occurs depends on the specificassumptions concerning the utility
functions of workers and risk aversion offinns. The assumptions under
which over employment occurs seem moreplausible to me than those under
which under employment occurs; but we donot have to resolve the matter
here: the theory can be dismissed on othergrounds, as we shall see
later.
First, however, we turn to a more detailedanalysis of the
conditions under which over or underemploymentresults. Which occurs
depends whether, in the first best equilibriumwith complete
observability, the firm would, in the good state,prefer the hours and
wage associated with the low state, or vice versa. Toascertain which
occurs, we need to examine in greater detail the structureof implicit
contracts.
3.1 The Structure of Implicit Contracts.
To examine the structure of implicitcontracts, we assume that
there are only two states, eachoccurring with a probability of 1/2; we
shall denote the good and bad statesby superscripts and subscript i and—15—
2 respectively. We represent the individuals utility function by U =
tJ(y,h)where y is income andIiis hours The worker's




Webegin our analysis by assuming firms are risk neutral, and
individuals have a reservation expected utility level of U.
Formally, we can characterize the implicit contract with complete
observability as the solution to the following problem:
(2) max +p2
(2a) subject to U +U2-2tJ






The first two conditions simply say that the marginal rate of
substitution equal the marginal rate of transformation (the full
employment condition while the third equation is the provision of
complete insurance (in the sense that the marginal utility of income of
the worker is equated in the two st. tes.) This follows from the risk
neutrality of the producer; it would not be true, as we shall see, if
the producer is risk averse.
We have represented the equilibrium in figure 2.p1 represents a
constant profit line in state 1, (i.e. eh—y=constant) and p2 in state 2.
As we have drawn It, the firm makes a positive profit in state 1, but a
loss in state 2. For any given level of profits, the hours-income
package is efficient, i.e. =1h1,y1}is the point where the worker's
indifference curve between hours worked and is tangent to the iso—profit—16—
line, and similarly for E2 (Equation 3 is themathematical
representation of this tangency condition). (We have not yet explained
how the levels of profits or losses in each state are determined.These
are given by the solutions to (2a), (3) and (ii).Thediagram is useful
only in portraying certain conditions which the implicit contract must
satisfy.)
There are three possible patterns which canemerge. Figure 1
illustrates the case where profits in state 1 are higher withE1 than
i.e.
(5) p1(h1, y ) > p'(h21y )
1 2
and profits in state 2 are higher with S2 than i.e.
2
(6) p2(h2,y ) > p (h1,y )
2 1
(5) and (6) are referred to as the self—selection constraints, and
infigure 2a, both are satisfied.
On the other hand, in figure 2b, in the good state the firm would
prefer E2 to E1, while in figure 2c, in the bad state the firm would
prefer to £2.In these cases, if the state of nature is not
observable, firms cannot be relied upon to tell the truth. The contract
must be modified to recognize this.
3.2 The Implicit Contract with Unobservability.
The implicit contract with unobservability is the solution to the
following problem
(7) max p1 —p2





This problem is identical to the previous one, exceptthat we have
appended the self—selection constraints.Under fairly standard
conditions, one, and only one, of these constraints arebinding. Which
depends on whether, in the absence of the constraint,firms would have
lied claiming it was a bad state when it was good, or a goodstate when
it is bad. Before turning to this, let us note diagramaticallywhat the
self—selection constraints imply. When In the absence of theself
section constraint, the finn would have said it was bad when it was
good, then the finn can be induced to tell the truth bylimiting the
amount of labor that he can hire in the bad state. Thus, in figure 3a,
the contract {E1 .g2'}satsifies the self—selection constraint, but
entails underemployment in the bad state. (In the good state, thefirm
is just indifferent between E1 and E21). Similarly, in figure 3b, we
show the equilibrium when the firm would have announced thatit was a
good state when it was bad. As we argued earlier,truth telling is
induced by requiring the finn to hire additional hours; the contract
(E1 ',E2}
induces truthtelling. Note that this contract entails
overemploynient: the marginal rate of transformation is lessthan the
marginal rate of substitution.
3.3 Over Versus Underemployment.
We now ask, which do we expect to occur, over or underemployment?
To help fix our ideas, consider first the case where utility functions
are separable in hours and income:
(11) U-u(y) —v(h)—18—
Thus, equality of marginal utility implies that - this, together
with (3) Implies that h1 >h2 and firms always want to declare that it
is a good state (to elucidate more effort). Theequilibrium is always
characterized by overemployment. (See figure 3).
The result holds, a fortiori, ifUhy < 0: since increasing the
number of hours worked decreases the marginalutility of income,
individuals in the good state receive less than in the badstate. Thus,
a necessary condition for implicit contracts with asymmetric information
to give rise to unemployment equilibria is that leisure andconsumptions
good are strong Edgeworth substitutes.
In Appendix B, we establish a somewhat stronger andmore general
result:18 if firms are riskneutral and the two states of nature are
near each other, then there is under or over—employmentas leisure is an
inferior or normal good. A sufficient condition forthere to be over or
full employment is that leisure is a normalgood. (Thus, a necessary
condition for under—employment is that leisure isinferior.)
On the other hand, the over—employmentequilibria have the
unattractive feature that individuals are always better offin the bad
state than in the good state. (See figure ic).19
18These results extendresults independently derived by Cooper (1983).
19This result doesnot depend upon any property of the individual's
utility function, other than quasi—concavity, Though thereare some
instances in which workers complain aboutbeing forced to work more than
they would like, the result that workers are better off inthe bad
state, suggests to me the inappropriateness of the model forexplaining
over—employment. One should not conclude that therefore, the relevant
equilibria are those entailing underemployment, but ratherthan the
model itself is at best of only limited relevance.—19—
3•14Risk Averse Firms
We argued in the preceding section that, with risk neutral firms,
there is a strong presumption that implicit contracts eitherentail full
employment or overemployment, but not underemployment.One attempt to
obtain underemployment from the implicit contract theory entails
assuming risk averse firms.
Consider the limiting case where finns are infinitely risk averse,
and individuals have a finite degree of risk aversion. Then,in
equilibrium, their profits in the two states must be the same, as
depicted in figure Ij It is immediately obvious that with infinitely
risk averàe firms, equilibrium will always be characterized by
unemployment.
In appendix B, we show that there is still a presumption that there
willbe over—employment rather than underemployment. We show that a
necessary condition for over—employment to result is that thefinn's
degree of risk aversion be large; in the case of separable utility
functions, the critical value increases with the worker's risk aversion
and decreases with the worker's elasticity of marginal disutility of
labor (see figure 5).
Curiously enough, while implicit contract theory began as a
explanation of wage rigidity in which risk neutral firms provide
insurance for risk averse workers, in this new version, underemployment
only results when firms are very risk averse.
Though the hypothesis of risk averse finns seems inconsistent with
a well—working capital market, in the New Theory of the Firm,in which
shareholdersareimperfectlyinformed concerning the actions of the
mangers,firms do behave in a risk averse manner. The question is do—20—
they behave in a sufficiently risk averse manner.
3.5 Some Special Examples
In this section, we present somesimple utility functions, for
which the first best equilibrium can beeasily calculated; for these
utility functions, it can easily be ascertained whetherthere will be
under or aver employment.
(a) Separable utility functions.
We have already noted that if theutility function is of the form
U =u(y)—v(h)
then, if firms areriskneutral, there will always be aver—employment.
If firms are risk averse, the condition forunderemployment citthetwo
states areneareach other) is that
A a v > (1a) R
where
A =A(Oh—y),the firm's measure of relative risk aversion
R =—UyyY,the individual's measure of relative riskaversion
iiy
V
,theelasticity at marginal disutility of labor
Uh
a —shareof labor
Since h1 increases withO, if the two states are far enough apart,
we will obtain over or full employment. (SeeAppendix B).
(b) Infinite elasticity of subsitutionbetween leisure and
consumption. In this case, the utility function isof the form—21—
(12) Us u(y —ah),ItSI, 02< a <01
income and leisure are perfect substitutes. This peculiar utility
function gives rise to corner solutions, where either individuals do no
work or work to capacity. With this utility function, the
self—selection constraints are never binding if finns are risk neutral,







individual's utility in the two states are equalized.) This result does
not depend on assuming a linear technology, as figure 6b illustrates.20
The unconstrained implicit contract is described by the tangencies of
the iso—profit curves to the worker's indifference curve. The
iso—profit curve for the good state is assumed to be always steeper than
the corresponding iso—profit curve through the same point for the bad
state. (Because of diminishing returns, the extra income that the firm
can pay to a worker who works more diminish the more the individual
works). It is clear that the self—selection constraints are always
satisfied If h1 > h2.
When firms are risk averse, the marginal utility of income of
workers in the two state will not be equalized. The implications of
this can be seen in figure 6c for the utility function (12). Assume
first that the firm has a linear technology. Then again, it is easy to
show (figure 6) that the self—selectibn constraint is always satisfied.
If, however, we assume diminishing returns and risk averse firms,
then, as figure6d illustrates, it is possible that in the good state,
20Though the results that h1 =1and h2 —0clearly do.—22—
firms will announce that It is in tact the bad(E2 lies on a higher iso—
profit function for state 1 than does S1 entails fewer hours and
less Income than does butthe decline in pay Is greater than the
loss in output.
(c) A Slight Generalization
If the individual has a utility function of the form
U -U(y
—v
the indifference curves between income and leisure are nolonger
straight lines; however, the results obtained in the previous section
still hold. This utility function has the property that leisure is





so the individual is on the same indifference curve in both states.
Hence, so long as the iso—profit curves satisfy the single crossing
property, the self—selection constraints are satisfied in the first—best
equilibrium. (See figure 6e).
(d) Risk Neutral Individuals
If individuals are risk neutral, then the objective of along term
contract is not to provide insurance to the worker.(Nor is it
plausible to think of the function of the insurance contract as a
mechanism for insuring the firm.) For a variety ofreasons, long term
contracts may save on transactions costs. Though the reason that
workers and employers engage in long term contractsmay have little to
do with the provision of insurance, attitudes towards riskplay an
important role in the design of efficient contracts, in the presence of—23—
asymmetricinformation.
With risk neutral individuals and finns, contracts which satisfy
the self—selection constraint are easy to construct. All we require is
that
> —)92(h1—h2)
Clearly, if the difference in productivity in the two states are
low,differences in income will be low. Note that in the case where
hours worked in the bad state exceed that in the good state, income paid
in the bad state must exceed that in the good state.
With risk neutral individuals, either there is full employment or
underemployment. 21
Identical results obtain if there is a third party providing
insurance to the finn, and workers are risk neutral.22
The hypothesis of low effective risk aversion on the part of
21For the case where the two states are near each other, the result
follows directly from the calculations of Appendix B. More generally,
with risk neutral individuals, the optimal employment contract is
described by the solution to the problem





y1> e1 h2 —y2
e2h2—y2>oh1 y1
LettingA1 and A be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the





workers is not as implausible as it might seem at first glance. Our
analysis has assumed that an individual's consumption is equal to his
wage payment; that he cannot save or borrow (or does not receive
implicit or explicit unemployment compensation.) In fact, most
fluctuations are sufficiently small that it is easy for individuals to
tide themselves over without any significant reduction in their
consumption. (There is some recent econometric evidence suggesting that
there is very limited variability in consumption, as opposed to the
purchase of consumer durables.) If that is correct, then the model we
have just presented seems more appropriate than one in which the worker
is risk averse. As we emphasized here, workers are not entering long
term contracts to have firms provide insurance, but to save on
transactions costs. If firms are also risk neutral, the efficient
contract give rise to neither unemployment or overemployment.















Subtracting the last equation form the next to the last equation, we
obtain






under the hypothesis that Uy =
Uy2
Hence, if
A1 —0, pitp2'; and thus A2 =0
22The problem of the firm is identical to that described above,except
(Footnote continued)—25—
costs,them simple contracts have a great advantage over complex
contracts;the simplest contract is one which pre—specif ices wages and
hours.23 The welfare loss (relative to the Walrastan equilibrium)can
be shown to be of the order or magnitude (01 —
Thewelfare loss relative to the self—selection equilibrium is
clearly smaller, and hence provided the fluctuat.ona in productivity are
not too large, it is plausible that a rigid wage—employment contract
dominates the self—selection contract.
Though in the absence of enforcement problems (as we have assumed
thus far) such fixed wage—employment contracts cannot explain
unemployment,once we introduce enforcement problems, they may easily
give rise to unemployment.214
3.6 Interpretation
The conditions which we have derived show, at the very least, that
the asymmetric information theory of implicit contracts does notprovide
a.robust. explanation of unemployment: whether there exists
22(continued)




where I is the payment from the insurance company to the firm in the bad
state (from the firm to the insurance company in the good state).
231nthegeneral theory of self—seleâtion, itis shownthatwith only
two states of nature, a self—selection equilibrium dominates a pooling
equilibrium, in the absence of transactions costs. See Stiglitz
(forthcoming).
2Z4see below, section 3.14. Note,however, that with enforcement problems
allthe calculations concerning the relative merits of self—selection
equilibria versus rigid—wage employment equilibria need to be redone.—26—
underemploymentis sensitive to special assumptions concerning the
natureofthe utility function andthedegree of risk aversion of finns.
Thetheory has several implications: first, it is reasonable to
assume different individuals and firms differ in their utility functions
and attitudes towards risk. Thus, if the theory provided the
explanation of unemployment, one should expect to find different firms
attracting different classes of workers. Risk neutral firms which
experienced limIted risk would always be characterized as having
over—employment in good states, full employment in bad; risk neutral
firms which had underemployment equlibria would have workers with
special attitudes towards risk. Firms whose behavior (in other
respects) seemed to indicate high degrees of risk aversion should
experienceunder—employment in bad states.
Notice too that when there is a dispute about how bad circumstances
are,unions try to persuade the finntohire more workers at the given
wage. Unions do not say to management, "we will be willing to accept a
further wage cut if youprovethat the state of nature is so bad, by
throwing more of us out of work," but rather, "we will be willing to
accept a further wage cut if you reduce your planned level of lay—offs."
If these statements are to be taken at anything like their face value,
they suggest that what is at issue is not a question of inducing
truthful revelation of the state of nature.
Notice that the theory of asymmetric information implicit contract
has turned the original theory of implicit contracts on its head. While
the original theory was based on risk averse workers, and risk neutral
firms, an essential part of the new theory is that firms are risk
averse. While the original theory was used to explain wage rigidities(and was successful in this, but not in explaining unemployment), the
new theory entails greater fluctuations in employee's income than in the
Walrasian equilibrium.
Though these obse'vations lead me to the view that this extension
(or reversal) of implicit contract theory does not provide an adequate
basis for understanding macro—economic fluctuations, there are other,
perhaps less contentious grounds on which to object to this version of
the Implicit Contract Theory as anexplanationof unemployment.
3.14 Further Objections to the Assymetric Information Iwlicit Contract
Theory.
There are several further objections to the theory. The first
concernswhat is observable. The theory assumes both too much and too
little.The theory assumes that thefirm's hours and wage decisions are
observabletothe worker, while the state of nature(or othersurrogates
•forthe stateof nature) are not. Though there issomepresumptionthat
eachworker knows the amount of his own work and wages (though even
here, there may be ambiguities arising from changes in jobs andthe
complexityof compensation packages), the worker is unlikely to be
informedconcerning total employment. The way that the underemployment
contracts "force" the firm to tell the truth is to restrict the amount
of labor the firmcanhire. If profits depend on aggregate employment,
thenthe firm can evade the force of these restrictions by hiring
outside workers. The analysis, as presented, only applies if the firm
cannot hire workers (or if there are significant fixed costs per worker,
so that the restriction in hours worked per old worker is costly.)
Not only are workers likely to be uninformed about the total number—28—
of employees, but even if they were informed about the total number of
employees, it would not convey all the requisite information; first, the
firm is concerned with the effective labor supply, and it can increase
that keeping the number of employees unchanged by increasing the quality
of the labor force; secondly, the boundaries of the firm are often
ill—defined. The firm could —andwould have an incentive to —selloff
some of its underutilized assets to a subsidiary. Distinguishing such
transfers from "legitimate" transfers would seem a difficult task for
the average blue collar worker.
Non—observability of hours (employment) and state of nature. If
hours (employment levels) as well as the state of nature are not
observable, (and there is nothing else relevant upon which to make wages
contingent) then the implicit contract will entail a fixed (wage,
employment (hours)) contract. Clearly, if the worker cannot be bound to
stay with the firm, and his productivity at different firms is perfectly
correlated, he will leave whenever his wage is less than his marginal
product; but in those states when the worker works for the firm his
average marginal product (plus any insurance premium paid initially)
must equal his wage. Thus, if there is no initial insurance premium.
the only viable markets are spot markets. (Insurance premiums may take
the form of the firm paying the individual less than his marginal
product during the initial period in which the worker is hired.)
Conversely, if firms cannot be bound not to fire workers, they will do
so whenever the workers marginal product is less than the wage, and
again, the only viable labor market is a spot market. When opportunity
costs are not perfectly correlated with the workers productivity in his
currentfirm, thenthere will exist a set of states of nature in which—29—
theworker will not quit and the firm will not tirehim.25 With
bilateral asymmetries of information, with hours workedand state of
nature not observable, with imperfectly correlated shocks,and with
contracts in which employment levels are not enforceable implicit
contracts can give rise to unemployment. Critical to thisresult is the
hypothesis that implicit contracts which specify wages are enforceable.
while those which specify employment levels are not; the reasonableness
of this hypothesis is addressed in section 3.5.26
Contingent Contracts. In the previous paragraphs, we have argued
that the standard asymmetric information implicit contract theory
assumes that variables which are probably not observable are. It also
(implicitly) assumes that variables which are observable arenot.
Though the state of nature is not perfectly observable, there are
many good surrogates: Consider the recent recessionin the car
industry; sales of automobiles (of each firm),inventories,and foreign
imports are readily observable. Moreover, aggregate variables, like
unemployment, money supply, and the rate of inflation etc., which may be
relevant to the demand facing an industry or firm are also readily
observable. Direct indications of profits areobservable.Though
25See Hall andLazear.
26There are, of course, other versions of asymmetric information models,
yielding somewhat different results. Cooper, for instance,has explored
a model in which firms are uniformed concerning workers marginalrates
of substitution. This model may easily give rise to under—employment
equilibria. But the underlying assumption behind the analysisis
unconvincing. While firms may plausibly be assumed to be imperfectly
informed concerning an individual's opportunity costs, it is not
plausible to assume, given that a worker remains on a job,that there
are significant variations in his marginal rates ofsubstitution between
leisureand income. (An exception would be provided by individualswho
hold second jobs, such as taxi—cab driving.)—30—
audited profits and true economic profitsmay well differ, and making
wages contingent upon audited profits would result in incentivesto
distort audited profits there are waysaroundthisproblem.First,
wages may be made contingent upon profits of other firms (thus
eliminating this "moral hazard problem", except if the finnscollude
together.). Secondly, wages may be made contingentupon the market
value of the firm; in a well functioningcapital market, these will
reflect true profits, and not audited profits, andagain, there will be
no incentive for a small investor to alter his marketvaluation because
of the wage consequences; thirdly, theremay exist compensation plans,
in which workers are paid partly with the sharesof the firm, where the
incentives for distorting behavior on the part of firmmanagers may be
mitigated. The fact of the matter is that relatively fewfirms have
(explicit) contracts employing such contingenciesas part of wage
determination. (The difficulty with implicit contract isthat, since
the terms are never explicit, one might claim thatsuch contingencies
are implicitly there.) Of course, even if suchinformation were
employed, there would be still a residual of imperfectinformation
concerning firm specific shocks (states of nature). Thus, it is
conceivable that the under or overemployment contractswe have described
above would still be employed. The questionremains, of course, of the
extent of the unemployment which can be soexplained.
3.6 Enforcement Problem.
A second, and equally damaging criticism ofthe theory concerns the
Problem of Enforceability, which we noted earlier.The contracts
described are one period contracts; yet theessence of the earlier
1—31—
(symmetricinformation) implicit contract is the long term relationship
between the employer and the employee. Although the older theory slid
quietly over the issue of how such contracts were to be enforced, we can
no longer do so. The contracts we have described above make sense only
as one period explicit contracts, not as many period implicit contracts.
The distinction between explicit and.implicit contracts has to do
with the enforcement mechanism. Explicit contracts are primarily
enforcedthrough the legal system (or the threat of resort to the legal
process..) Implicit contracts are enforced through two mechanisms:
firms that violate their implicit contract loose their reputation, and
rindit difficultto recruit additional workers; and workers within the
firmwho feel that they have been cheated against may reduce their
effort (or act in other ways which reduce the firm's profitability.) It
should be emphasized that one enforcement mechanism does not dominate
the other: to enforce a contract through the legal system requires that
the alleged breach of contract can be verified; both sides may know, in
their heart of hearts, that the contract has been breached, but the side
thathasbreached it mayalsoknow that the other side cannot establish
that fact to the court. In that circumstance, the firm may still loose
its reputation; reputation may be an effective enforcement mechanism.
On the other hand, when interest rates are positive, firms must
balance the gains fran cheating (violating the implicit contract) with
the losses (say from the loss of reputation); in sufficiently bad
states, it may pay them to cheat, to violate the implicit contract.
More accurately, the implicit contract must take into account the fact
that certain contract provisions which could (under appropriate
conditions of verifiability and observability) be enforced through the—32—
legal mechanism cannot be enforced by a reputation mechanism. The view
of implicit contracts we are putting forward is that they represent
perfectequilibrium(wage, employment) strategies in a repeated game
betweenemployers and employees. 27
Whatdo equilibrium contracts (implicit or explicit) between
workers and employers engaged in a long term relationship look like?
The answer depends on what is observable, what the rate of interestis,
and the structure of the shocks to the economy. Consider, for instance,
an infinite period contract with no discounting, in a world in which the
probability, each period, that the state of nature is good, is 1/2.
Then by standard arguments it can be shown that the employercan be
forced to tell the truth (almost) all of the time: in the longrun,
unless he announces that it is good half the time and bad half the time,
he will be severely punished. And if he must announce good half the
time and bad half the time, he would announce good when it is good, and
bad when it is bad; moreover, the optimal contract under such
circumstances entails full employment. Once again, implicit contracts
(even under asymmetric information) have explained wage rigidity, but
failed to explain unemployment.28
27We have drawn the line betweenimplicit and explicit contracts
sctewhat more finely that we should. Even when there is an explicit
contract, reliance may be placed on reputation as an enforcement
mechanism, both because of the costs of resorting to the legal mechanism
and because of the inevitable ambiguities assocated with the terms of
any contract. In addition, there is a long legal tradition stipulating
that not all the terms of the contract which can be enforcedthrough
legal processes need to be made explicit, and not all the terms which
are made explicit can be enforced through the legal process.
28Obviously, if the shocks at date tand t+1 are perfectly
correlated, there is, in effect, only one shock; but then the assumption
that the worker remains uninformed about what the state of nature is
(Footnote continued)—33—
Thoughthe structure of the optimal multi—period contracts with
positive interest rates has not received detailed analysis,what is
known about multi—period self selection problems suggeststhat their
structure (entailing elaborate interperiod contingency provisions)will
be even more unlike what is observed than the one periodstructure.29
Implicit contracts as perfect equilibria. One difficultywith
analyzing implicit contracts as perfect equilibria is thatit appears
that there may be a superabundance of such equilibria. We are
particularly interested, however, in ascertaining whether there are
equilibrium which entail wage rigidity and unemployment. If contracts
which ensure that wages do not vary can be enforced, why cannot
contracts that ensure full employment be enforced? Let me suggest a
tentative answer: recall earlier that we distinguished two reputational
enforcement mechanisms, one based on the reaction of potential
employees, the other of current employees. If the firm believesthat it
will be some time before it wishes to hire workers again, the present
discounted value of the loss of the "outside" reputation may be
relatively low; yet the firm may still be very concerned with the good
will of its present employees, a central part of the efficiency wage
28
(continued)
becomes implausible. Eventually, it should learn that the finn faces
bad prospects. So long as the state of nature eventually becomes known,
the asymmetric information restrictions are irrelevant.
29From the general theory of self—selection, contracts may entail
randomness (See Stiglitz (1982)); how such random contracts are to be
enforced appears even more problematic than how the non—stochastic
contracts discussed so far are to be enforced.
For a discussion of optimal multi—period contracts, see Stiglitz
and Weiss (1983). Note that since some of the shocks tothe economy are
common environmental shocks, the optimal contract should employ
information from other firms, as in Nalebuffstiglitz (1983a,i983b).-.3" —
hypothesispresented in Part II. Thus, an equilibrium contractmay
entail the finn paying all retained employees a fixedwage which entails
a subsidy in all states; it the state is bad enough, the firm will
reduce its loses by firing (laying off) a fraction of its workers.30
3.7 Lay—offs and Contract Complexity
The version of the implicit contract theory withasymmetric
information we have presented explains at best work reductions(work
sharing) but not layoffs, and not unemployment. Those versionsof the
theory which attempt to explain layoffs usually simplyassume it: the
worker is assumed either to work or not to work1so that reductions in
work can only show up as layoffs. As we arguedearlier, whether with
asymmetric or symmetric information efficient contracts shouldentail
work sharing. Moreover, since they do not providean explanation of job
hiring,knowing the determinants of job lay—offs provides an explanation
of unemployment only when it is assumed that laboris immobile.
A final unattractive feature of mostversionsof asymmetric
informationimplicit contracts is there complexity. If there aremany
states of nature, the efficient contract will entailspecifying, for
each set of observable variables, an hours,wage schedule; each schedule
30We have focused hereon one side of the enforcement problem: ensuring
that the firm does not cheat on the worker. There isanother side which
has received attention the worker who has been subsidizedin the bad
state leaving the firm in the good state. If the workeralways left the
firm whenever his wage was less than the value of hismarginal product, the finn would never be able topay the worker more than his marginal
product in the good states. There is an obvious solution: makethe
individual pay his insurance premium before he startsto work;
equivalently, since workers are normally hired in good states,pay the
worker less than his marginal product the first period ofemployment.
See }folmstrom.—35—
will have many points on it; the schedule is likely to be highly
non—linear. (Specifying the contract as an explicit contract seemshard
enough; knowing whether such an implicit contracthad been broken would
seem nigh impossible.)
In the next two sections, we present two models which remedy these
two deficiencies.
4. Complexity of Contracts.
So far, we have not been able to elicit out of the implicit
contract theory a convincing basis of a theory of unemployment. The
explanations provided in this and the next section are, I think, more
convincing.
The first is based on the problem noted earlier on the complexity
which can be encompassed within an (explicit or, a fortiori, implicit)
contract. The contracts described earlier resulting in full employment
required wage payments and hours to.vary from state to state. If we
restrict this even a little, we obtain the possibility of unemployment
equilibria. For instance, Newbery and I have considered a simple
macro—economic model in which the "shock" to the economy is the
variability in export prices. All contracts are made contingent upon
the export price. We show that with any linear indexing rule even when
the level of indexing is optimally chosen there may be unemployment.
Similar results obtain with other simple (log linear, quadratic, etc.)
rules.
5.TheoryofMoralHazard and Labor Turnover.
Layoffsrepresent a non—price response to a market disturbance:36—
ratherthan lowering wages in the face or a decrease indemand,
employmentis rationed.It is natural, thus, tolook foranexplanation
forthis in other instances where markets are characterizedby
rationing;it is bynow well known insurance markets in which adverse
selectionand moral hazard problems arise are, ingeneral, characterized
by quantity rationing (See Rothschild and Stiglitz(1976), Wilson
(1977), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Arnott and Stiglitz(1983)).
Recall earlier we argued that a theory (ofimplicit contracts)
which purports to explain unemployment must notonly explain layoffs,
but also why those who are layed off are not rehired.In general, the
shocks facing different finns are not perrectlycorrelated. If
information were costless, individuals who are atfirms where the value
of the marginal productivity of those workers hasdecreased would move
to other firms; labor would be reallocated, untilthe value of the
marginal productivity of all workers at all firms was thesame. Note in
this case the optimal contract would notrequire the finn provide any
unemployment insurance; individualswould never be unemployed; the only
insurancerequired would be wage insurance, and it need not beprovided
by the firm. Now assume that information (search) iscostly and the
process of gathering information is stochastic, so that some individuals
who search are unsuccessful.
The risk that is to be insured is not just that thefinn has a bad
state; it is the risk that the firm has a bad state, that theindividual
searches, and is unsuccessful in finding a job.31
31Even if searchwere costly in time, but not in goods, and if it were
always successful, if individuals had a separableutility function, an
individual who happened to be in a lowproductivity firm and was layed
(Footnote continued)—37-.
Ifthe finn provided complete wage and employment insurance, the
individual at the low productivity firm would have no incentive to
search. The more complete the insurance provided, the less incentives
for search, and the less efficient the resulting resource allocation.
The firm, of course, is not interested in the efficiency of the societal
resource allocation; but by inducing individuals to move elsewhere in
bad states, the firm saves the subsidy which is implicit in the wage
contractin those states. If search were observable, the optimal
contract would provide for unemployment compensation which was
conditionalupon the level of search. But search is not observable, and
this is what gives rise to the moral hazard problem. -
Thereare two instruments which are available to the finn for
inducing search; one of them is to lower the wage of individuals who are
retained, and the other is to lay off workers. In general, Arnott,
Hosios, and Stiglitz (1983) show that both instruments will be employed.
The nature of the search process (the individual either does or does not
obtain employment) introducesa natural non—convexity into the problem,
whichimplies that even if all individuals are identical, it pays to lay
off some workers; it is not optimal to rely simply on work sharing. But
in addition, some workers are better than others, and for a number of
reasons (both information, equity, and institutional) it may not be
possible to differentiate wages among them. Lowering wages results in a
differentially higher quit rate among the high quality workers; layoffs
31(continued)
off would not be compensated by any severance pay. Indeed, if leisure
and goods are complements, the optimal contract would entail negative
severance pay, were that feasible.—38--
donot have a correspondingadverse effect on qualtity.
Onthe other hand, when individuals differ in their search costs,
reduced wages have an advantage over layoffs. When wages are reduced,
those with lower search costs will be induced to search for a better job
(where they are more productive); layoffs force both high and low search
cost individuals to search.32
This model thus has accomplished what the other theories of
implicit contracts could not do:it has provided an explanation of the
simultaneous occurrence of wage reductions and layoffs (of on the job
and of f the job search); and it has provided a model of the labor market
in which there is an equilibrium level of unemployment. (The theory is,
of course, not inconsistent with the theories of implicit contracts with
asymmetric information; the structure of the implicit contracts
discussed by Arnott, Hosios, and Stiglitz, the specification ofwages,
hours, and layoff rates in good and bad states, depends on whether the
state of nature is or is not observable by workers.)
Patterns of Unemployment
We noted in section 2 that a "good" theory of unemployment should
explain not only the presence of unemployment, but also its pattern.
Thus, it should explain layoffs as well as work sharing. Our model does
this. It should also explain which workers get layed off. To some
32Several otherpapers have also focused on the issue of interfirm
mobility. Holmatrom (1983) has considered its implications for the
enforceability of contracts (with workers leaving in good states.) The
paper closest in spirit to the Arnott—Hosios—stiglitz paper is that by
Geanakoplos and Ito (1981), but they do not focus on the moral hazard
issues which are central to Arnott—Hosios—Stiglitz. For a partial
survey, see Ito (1982).—39..-
extent,ourmodeldoes this too. It is consistent with the use of the
seniority system of layoffs; younger individuals may have bothlower
costs andgreaterbenefits from search. But it doesnot seem toexplain
whycertain groups, likewomanandminorities, should experience more
cyclicalunemployment that do white males. The model presented in Part
II does provide an explanation both for the use of layoffs and for the
concentration of layoffs among certain groups.
The Paradox of the Preference for Being Layed Off
The model has one other failing: it does not provide a
satisfactory resolution of the seeming paradox which arises in many
implicit contract theories, in which the workers who are layed off are
better off than those who are not. Consider, for instance, the case of
a separable utility function; with full insurance, and no opportunities
for being rehired, the pay of those layed off must be the same as that
of those retained; but sincethose layed off enjoy more leisure, their
totalutility is higher. All workers would be petitioning to be layed
0ff333U
IfU)thereis some probability that a worker3536 will be
33Obviously if Uis positive enough, the retained workers will be
better off than !yed off workers. In the terminology of Arnott and
Stiglitz, being layed off is a marginal utility increasing or decreasing
accident depending on whether Uvho; with fullinsurance, marginal
utility increasing accidents alCiays lead the individual experiencing the
accident to be better off.
31The result iseven stronger if leisure and consumption, are
complements,in the sense thatU< 0. Those who arelayedoff have
more time to enjoy their goods, Xnd thusreceive more goods thanthose
whoare left to work. In Appendix A we show that if leisure is normal,
layed off workers will be better off.—i 0—
rehired, (ii) we ignore theeffect ofunemployment benefits on search;
and(iii)the firm cannot matitor whether or not the individual is
rehired,and so mustset itsunemployment benefit as a fixed payment,
than thepayment will be set to equate the expected marginal utilities;
that is, if we assume a separable utility function, and let be the
individual's income if he is retained (in the bad state), b be his
lay—oft benefit, and y be his income if he is rehired (a random
variable) then b is set so that
Eut (y +b) U
Whetherthe expected utility of income is greater or less for the
laid off worker than the retained worker depends on the shape of the
utility function, on whether utility is a concave or convex function of
marginal utility. While with a quadratic utility functioi the retained
worker is better off, a necessary and sufficient condition for the
worker to be worse off is that there is decreasing absolute risk
aversion. (It is straightforward to derive more general conditions with
non—separable utility functions under which retained workers are better
off.)
Now wemusttake into account the fact that, in the bad state, the
pay of the layed off worker affects their quit propensity. By
35Though there are a few instances of "inverse seniority" ——where
unemployment benefits plus layoff pay is sufficiently generous that
workers with greater seniority prefer to be layed off ——thisis more
the exception than the rule. See, for instance, Bloom and Northrup
(1977).
models with work sharing, the corresponding paradox is that
workers' utility is higher in the bad state than in the good.—41—
assumption,the firm is subsidizing workers in the bad state, so would
like to encourage them to leave. Thus, the firm lowers thepay of the
retained workers. This strenghtens the presumption that retained
workersare worse off than laid off workers.
We have established thefactthat workers whoare layedoff may be
rehired means that it is possible thatretainedworkers may be better
off than layed of f workers, under the plausible conditionthat leisure
and consumptionarecomplementsorindependent.37 But whether retained
workersare or are not better of fremainsdependent on specific
propertiesof the utility function, and plausible utility functions
still lead to the seemingly paradoxical results.
-
Ourargument in favor of lowering wages for retained workers, to
encourage them to search, ignored the effect of lowering wages on their
productivity. This is not the first instance in which we have noted
indirect effects of current wages on the costs facing firms: we earlier
referred to the fact that to the extent that firms had to rely on
reputation mechanisms to enforce contracts, firms had two motivations
for paying high wages: to ensure the productivity of their current
workers and to lower future recruitment costs.
These are but examples of a more general phenomena, which we refer
to as the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis, which provides an alternative, and
we believe more plausible, basis of the theory of unemployment, than the
implicit contract theory.
37There are otherways of resolving this seeming paradox. For instance,
as we noted earlier, if search is time intensive (but does not use
goods), but always successful, then layed off workers will not be
compensated for the loss of time associated with search. They will be
worse off than retainedworkers.—U2—
II
EfficiencyWage Theories of Unemployment
6. The Basic Argument.
The basic hypothesis of the efficiency wage theories of
unemployment is that the (net) productivity of workers is a function of
the wage paid. Itthatis the case, then firms may be reluctant to
lower wages, even in the face of an excess supply of labor; to do so
might lower the productivity more than proportionately, so that total
laborcosts are actually increased. Competitive equilibrium is thus
consistent witha situation in which there is an excess supply of
laborers. The Law of Supply and Demand has been Repealed.
Moreover, since the relationship between productivity and wage may
differfrom industry to idustry, wages (for similar laborers) may differ
across industries. The Law of the Single Pricehas also been repealed.
(Thus,there may exist in equilibrium some sector in which these
efficiency wage considerations are not relevant, in which a conventional
competitivewage is paid, while in some other sector(s), higher wages
are paid; these higher paid jobs are obviously rationed, and queues for
these jobs may serve as equilibrating mechanism,38 a substitute for the
adjustments in wages which do not take place because of the effect of
wages on productivity.)
381t seems to be merely a semanticquibble to claim that so long as
there is some industry in which rationing does not exist, there cannot
be involuntary unemployment. The models we construct have the property
that individuals who are identical (or nearly identical) are treated
differently, and have markedly different levels of expected utility.It is important to note that the, economy is not always
characterized by unemployment,39 only thatitmay be. And changes in
the economy (the destruction of some capital, the change in technology,
etc.) may move the economy from a full employment regime to an
unemployment regime, or may change the equilibrium level of unemployment
in the economy.
7. Alternative Explanations of the Wage—Productive Relationship
There are at least five different explanations of this phenomenona
which have been discussed in the literature.
The earliest, noted in the development literature, was based on the
hypothesis that, at least at low levels of nutrition, individual's
productivity depended on their nutrition, which depended in turn an
their' pay. A productivity—wage curve of the form depicted in figure 6
was hypothesized by Leibenstein (1957) and subsequently analyzed in
greater detail by Mirrless (1975) and Stiglitz (1976). If A(w) is the
efficiency of a worker receiving a wage w, the firm chooses a wage which
minimizes the wage costs per efficiency unit,
(13) mm w/A(w)
the solution to which entails
(114)A' (w*) —A/iit
w*is referred to as the efficiency wage and is depicted in figure 7 as
the tangency between a line through the origin and the wage productivity
curve.
Assume the aggregate production function of the industrial sector
39me Repeal of the Law ofSupply and Demand is thus a selective repeal.—141j—
isof the form
QF(A L)
where L is the number of workers, and A is their efficiency. Let
output of the sector be our numeraire; firms in the sector will pay a
wage w, and hire workers up to the point where:
* * * (15)A(w )F'(LA(w ))=w
the (value of the) marginal product equals the real wage. Let LD(w*) be
the solution to (15). If LD(w*) < t.., the supply of workers to the
industrial sector, there will be unemployment: no firm will have any
incentive to lower wages.
This version of the theory is useful in helping to bring out the
basic structure of the argument, but nutritional considerations are of
limited relevance for wage determination in more developed countries.
The second theory is based on labor turnover (Phelps (1970),
Stiglitz (19714, 1982)): the lower the wage, the higher the rate of
labor turnover; so long as the finn must bear some part of the turnover
costst° this lowers the net productivity of a worker.
This can again easily give rise to unemployment. To see this most
simply, assume that individuals leave firms for two reasons: they die,
at an exponential rate, p, orthey quit, to obtain a higher paying
job. Assume for simplicity, that they make s searches per unit time.
Assume all, firms paid the same wage w*. Then any firm which paid a wage
greater or equal to wM would have a quit rate of p ,whileany firm
which paid a wage less than w* would have a quit rate of p +s(since
°So long as workers are riskaverse, more risk averse than firms, firms
will bear some of these costs. See Arnott and Stiglitz (1983). See
also Hashimoto (1981).—145—
every firm that the searcher sampled would be paying a wage in excess of
the lower wage). The quit rate appears as in figure 8. The labor costs
of the firm (per unit time) are
w +(r+q)T
wherer is the rate of interest and q is the quit rate, and T is the
training costs. ((rq)T represents the amortization of the training
costs.) Clearly, these are minimized at the wage w*. Thus, if the
economy experiences a shock (a war which decreases the capital stock),
and there is not a coordinated wage reduction, unemployment will
develop. It does not pay any firm to lower its wage, even in the
presence of unemployment (because ths unemployed workers, though
thankful now to get a lower paid job, will continue to search for a
still better job.)
This model can easily be enriched to include individuals differing
in their attitudes towards non—pecuniary characteristics of the firm,
and searching for a good match between themselves and the firm. While
in the simple version presented in the preceding paragraph, there is
alway some full employment equilibrium (although many unemployment




Uote that this problem could be resolved if individuals could be
forced to pay all of their training costs but this would give rise to a
moral hazard problem on the part of the firm: it would have an
incentive to charge individuals for allegedly training them, and then
fail to provide any training. This problem may be partly resolved by
use of contests (Bhattacharya (1983)) or promotion ladders (Carmichael
(1983)). Moreover, individuals may not have the capital to pay for all
of their training costs. In any case, as we have noted, if individuals
are risk averse, it is not optimal to force workers to bear the entire
brunt of the risk that he may be ill suited to the firm. As a factual
matter, firms do bear some of the turnover costs.The third theory (Stiglitz (1976), Weiss (1980) Nalebuff and
Stiglitz (fortircoming)) is based on imperfect information concerning
the characteristics of workers (and/or an inability for legal or
sociological reasons to differentiate wages among individuals whose
characteristics differ.) The quality mix of applicants depends on the
wages offered (and the quality mix of those who quit a firm dependon
the wages paid to its current employees). Ingeneral, by paying higher
wages, one obtains a higher quality laborforce.12
The fourth theory is based on imperfect information concerning the
actions of workers: the costs of. monitoring them perfectly in the
presence of such costs, firms must have some method of inducing "good
behavior", some threat against workers that are caught shirking. If
there were full employment, any worker who was fired would immediately
simply find another job (at the same wage). To induce workers not to
shirk, firms thus attempt to raise their wages relative to that paid by
obtain an efficiency wage, one must show more than a dependence of
quality on wages, but that quality increases sufficiently fast with
wages that it does not pay firms to lower their wages in theface of
unemployment. Conditions under which this occurs have been derived in
Stiglitz (1976, 1982).
Some have objected to this theory on the grounds that firms
eventually learn individual's abilities; hence workers could be required
to post a bond, which they would forfeit if it turned out later that
they were not as good as they claimed. The objections to this are
similar to those discussed earlier concerning the requirement to make
individuals pay all of their training costs. Individuals may not have
the capital to post the bond, and there is a moral hazard problem on the
part of the firm. Some effective bond posting does occur, when
individuals intially accept a lower wage, until they have proven
themselves; but this imposes a further' cost on individuals, in an
inefficient intertemporal pattern of consumption.
Even when individuals are not well informed about their abilities,
it may pay a firm to offer an above market wage, to elicit a larger
applicant pool, among which it can select those which are best matched
with the firm.
What is at issue here is in part an empirical question: do firms
(Footnote continued)—'47—
others. This hastwoconsequences. If all firms were identical, then
they would not raise their wages relative to each other, but as they
raisGdwages, their demand for labor would decrease, and unemployment
wouldincrease. So long as the level of unemployment compensation is
less than the market wage, the period of unemployment serves as a
discipline device. The equilibrium level of unemployment may be
depicted as in figure 9. Assume there are only two levels of effort
(O,e) and that the unemployment compensation level is fixed.It seems
plausible that the lower the level of unemployment, the higher the wage
the (inn must pay to make itwOrthwhilefor an individual not to shirk.
This no shirking wage is depicted as an upward sloping curve, increasing
with the level of employment. The demand for labor (assuming that
workers do not shirk) is the usual downward sloping function ofthe
wage. The equilibrium is the intersection of the two.3
Themajor objection to this theory is that there areother methods
ofprovidingdiscipline to the labor force, e.g. forcing them to post
bond. The limitations on these mechanisms are well known (see footnote
21$above),but itisworth noting that firms do employ indirect forms of
bonding to some extent. Hall has noted that unemployment rates are
highest among groups who, because of limited resources, are least able
topost bonds.
The difference between the last two models andthe standard
'42(continued)
believe that by lowering wages they will lower the quality of their
labor force, with a loss in productivity exceeding the savings in wages?
version of the theory is developed by Shapiro andStiglitz
(i98'i). In their more general model, monitoring costs (and hence
monitoring intensity) is endogenous. See also Calvo (1979).—148—
competitive paradigm should be noted: the latter assumes that all
individuals are paid strictly on a piece rate, that their actions can be
perfectly monitored. If they perform the contracted for action, they
get paid; if the don't, they don't. In fact, most individuals have at
most asmall fraction oftheir compensation depend directly on
performance;in many cases, individual performance cannot be directly
observed;at best, group performance canbe observed, and thenonly with
a lag. Firms docare about the qualityoftheir labor force;they are
worriedabout providing incentives to their workers (in the competitive
paradigm,the firm couldcare less whether a worker decides to work or
not;there is a competitive supply of workers readily available to
perform any service; a worker who does not do what he has contracted to
do is replaed by one who will).
The fifth set of theories are the sociological theories recently
propounded by korge Akerlof (198U). Though many of the patterns of
behavior which he describes might equally well be described by one of
the theories which we have provided here, there are some which are not.
In particular, he noted that individuals' performance depends critically
on whether they believe they are being "fairly" treated. We shall
return to this observation later.
Though the five theories differ in a number of important respects,
they have a common mathematical structure: the net productivity of a
worker at the ith firm is a function of the wage paid by the firm, w,
wage paid by other firms, wi and the unemployment rate (or, more
generally, the expected duration in the unemployment pool)
=Ai(Wj,wi,u)
The equilibriumlevel of unemployment, and wage structure may be—u 9—
derived, and the consequences of various policy changes investigated,
for alternative specifications of A
8. Patterns of Uneoloyment: A Further Inlication of the Efficiency
Wage Model.
The Efficiency wage models are not only consistent with there being
unemployment in a competitive market equilbrium; they providesome
insights into the patterns of observed unemployment. Ifgroups differ
intheirrelationships between wage and productivity, as illustrated in
figure 10, equilibrium will be characterized by some groups being fully
employed, other groups being partial employed, and still other groups
being rationed out of' the market. Changes in the aggregate demand for
labor will have very large differential effects on the employment of
different groups. (This is in contrast, for instance, to the standard
theories, were the wages of different groups might be affected
differentially, but there is not reason to expect, once wages have
adjusted, differential unemployment rates among different groups.)
9.The Consequences of Policy changes.
The policy consequences may differ markedly depending on the
explanation of the dependence of productivity on wages. Consider, for
instance, an increase in the unemployment compensation. In the
"shirking" version of the efficiency wage model, this results in firms
having to raise their wages, to induce workers not to shirk (the penalty
for being caught is smaller at any fixed wage and unemployed level);
this in turn results in a higher equilibrium unemployment rate and a
higher real wage. On the other hand, in the quality—efficiency wage—50—
model, an increase in unemployment compensation may have a differential
effect on the search intensities of individuals of different abilities,
and thus shift the wage—productivity curve facing different firms. If
low productivity workers' search is reduced relative to the high
productivity workers, then the applicant productivitwage curve may
shift up, as in figure ii, with a consequent change in the wage (it may
either increase or decrease), and increase in the demand for labor. In
figure 12 we have depicted a case where there are low and high
productivity individuals but the number of individuals of each
productivity type who search for a job is affected by the level of
unemployment compensation. In figure 12a the mean ability of those
applying at high wages is increased; the wage is unchanged, but the
demand for labor increased; while in figure llb the mean ability of
those applying at high wages is decreased sufficiently that the optimal
wage is lowered (and unemployment is consequently eliminated.)
All of these models should be contrasted with the policy
implication of the naive fixed price model, in which an increase in
unemployment compensation would be unambiguously desirable, since wages
and prices are (by assumption) unchanged, while the unemployment
compensation increases aggregate demand.
Thus, though the structure of the equilibrium with the efficiency
wage model and the fixed price model may look very similar (real wages
do not respond to the presence of unemployment), and a careful general
equilibrium analysis of an economy with efficiency wages would entail
the same kind of detailed analysis of spill—overs and constraints that
have characterized the fixed price literature, the comparative statics
analysis and the analysis of the consequences of policy changes is-51-
completelydifferent.For inourmodels, realwages,though notfalling
to the market clearing levels,do respond to changes in policies.
10. The Efficiency Wage Hypothesisand Cyclical Fluctuations
We have seen in the previous sectionhow the efficiency wage model
cangiverise to an equilibrium level of unemployment.Changes in the
economy, in say thelevelof productivity of worKers, in the capital
stock, in the level of unemploymentcompensation, give rise to different
levels of equilibrium unemployment. Thus, one approach•to seeing
whether (or the extent to which) the efficiency wagemodel provides
insights into cycical fluctuations is toacertain the extent to which we
canidentify parameter changes which would resultin a change in the
equilibrium level of unemployment.
For instance, itis easy to show that a lowering of the demand
curvefor labor in figure B (for instance, as a resultof the
destruction of some of the country's capitalstock) will result both in
lower wages and a higher unemployment rate.
But theinsights obtained from the efficiency wage hypothesis
extend beyond those directly obtained fromthis kind of equilibrium
analysis. Even if equilibrium werecharacterized by full employment,
the economy's adjustments to disturbances may besuch as to result
(frequently) in unemployment)'
The argumentmaybe seenmostsimply by considering the labor
turnover model present above. We noted therethat there exists a full
remarks in this andthenext section are based on research in
progress,andtherefore are of a more speculative naturethan results
reportedearlier in this paper.—52—
employmentequilibrium, in which all firms pay a wage, wat which the
demand for labor equals the Supply. Assumethat some of the capital
stock has been destroyed, so that there isa new full employment
equilibrium with a lower real wage.
Consider now what happens if there isany friction in the wage
setting process. Assume, in particular, that allcontracts last for two
periods (seconds. days, years?) and that somecontracts come up for
renewalineven periods, others in odd; assume further thatfinns can
hirewithina period. Then given even this slightamount of friction,
theonly equilibrium entails the real wageremaining unchanged, with the
resulting increase in unemployment. (It the firmswhich have the option
of lowering their wage did so, they wouldfind that they experienced a
higherquit rate,and lower profits.)'45
The argument is, of course, more general thanthis simple example:
since the optimal wage atone firm depends on the wageat the other
firms(and theunemploymentrate),giventhat (some firms) do not
adjust,it does not pay others to adjust: to thefull equilibrium levels.
Adjustments may occur, but they occur slowly.46
Furthermore, the private losses from not reducingwages in the
efficiency wage model are of second order, while in thestandard
competitive model, they are first order; that is, ifwe write the
4See, forinstance, J. Taylor, for a discussion ofstaggered contracts.
The theory, as presented, does notexplain why contracts should be
staggered. Hosios has developed a theory, basedon information costs,
for why in equilibrium, contracts wouldnot be signed simultaneously by all firms.
'6For amore formal development of these ideas,see Stiglitz
(forthcoming).-.53—
profitsof the firm as a function of its wage, the wage paid by other
firms, theamount of labor hired and a vector of other parameters,
p p (Wi •L,ri)
in the efficiency wage model, the wage is set so that
p-o
whilein the standard competitive model1 the wage is always the lowest
wage at which the firm can obtain workers. Assume nowthat some
paramenter flj has changed and that the wage at which a firm can obtain






but the change in profits from this change in wages is zero (since
=0).But in thestandard competitive paradigm, if firms can obtain
workers at lower wages, their profits are strictly increased.
As a result, one might expect some "almost rational" firms not to
fully adjust their wages in response to disturbances which theyface.
(See Akerlof and Yellen (1983)). Such distortion in the behavior of one
agent in the economy has, of' course, its general equilibrium
consequences, e.g. on prices elsewhere in the economy. But these arein
the nature of pecuniary externalities, and were the economy initialily—51J—
at a pareto efficient allocation (whererationing did not occur, e.g.
because of efficiency wage considerations), theeconomy would still be
pareto efficient; but under the circumstances describedhere, there are
real welfare consequences of these failureson the part of some firms to
adjust their wages 17
11. Nominal Versus Real Rigidities
There is a widespread beliefamong macro—economists that it is
nominal rigidities, not real rigidities, whichare to be explained. The
evidence on this matter is not completelyconvincing. The few
experiments on fully neutral monetary changes ——thechangefrom old
francs to new francs ——suggestthat such changes may haverelatively
fewreal effects. Other forms ofmonetaryinjection are never
uniformilydistributed among the population, and it iseasy to construct
(not necessarily plausible) models in whichnon—uniform monetary
injections will have real effects. Moreover,economies which have
practiced extensive indexing (so moneywages are not rigid) have
experienced episodes of unemployment just as economies inwhich indexing
is not so widely practiced.
Still, it is worth noting that two versions of theefficiency wage
model may give rise to rigidities inmoney wages. In the labor turnover
model, we noted an indeterminancy of equilibrium. If allfirms were
paying a wage w, it would pay them to continue topay that wage, in
spite of a change in the demand or supply of labor.The critical wage
7This resultis an application of a more general resulton market
mediated extenalities in economies withincomplete markets and imperfect
information (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1983).—55—
could be setin moneyor realterms. If each firm believes that all
othersare going to leave money wagesunchanged, it would not pay any
firmto change his (money) wage. In an economywhich has not
experienced rapid rates of inflation in the past,it may be natural to
"fix" on the money rate; while in other economies,where indexing is
more prevalent, it may be the real wagewhich is rigid.
The second explanation is based on Akerlof's sociologicaltheories
of the efficiency wage. If individuals come to believethat money wage
reductions are unfair, then it does not pay firms to reducetheir money
wages. At one level, such an explanation seemsunsatisfactory: why
should individual come to view nominal wage changes of anymoment? But
if workers exhibit such irrationalities, it pays forfirms to reflect
those irrationalities in their wage setting policies.Such a theory may
havesome degree of plausibiltiy for the short run,in an economy which
hashadlittle experience with inflation; but it is unconvincingin the
long run: but then do we have much evidence ofnominal wage rigidities
insuch economies?
Conclusions
Those of us brought up in traditional Keynesian macro—economies were
taught the importance of the assumption of wage rigidity.This was
described as a Fact of Life, explained by vague reference to certain
institutionalfactors. If wagerigidity is aà centralto the
explanantion of unemployment as many modern renditionsof Keynes seem to
suggest,surely we need to explain this wage rigidity. The objectiveof
this paper has been to investigate two important classes of
explanations.—56—
Thefirst approach, the implicit contracttheory, has had a long,
but sad, history.118
The simpler models put forward a decadeand a half ago provided an
explanation of the lack of variability ofreal wages, but not an
explanation of unemployment. The morecomplicated asymmetric
information models were found
unconvincing: they more easily gave rise
toover—employment thanunderemployment, and theforms of contracts to
beexpected, were asymmetric information considerations
paramount, are
not observed. Other versions of theasymmetric information implicit
contract model, explicitly longtermin nature, may give rise to full
employment. Two versions of the implicitcontract model did give rise
tounemployment: those with limitations on thecomplexity of the
contracts which could be designed and thosein which search was costly
andcould not be monitored. Though thesemay provide part of the
explanantion of the observed patterns ofwages and unemployed, of who
becomes unemployed, and why unemploymenttakes the form of layoffs
rather than work—sharing, additionalinsights may be obtained from the
ll8There is thesuggestion in the implicit contract approachthat, since the terms of the contract, which leadupon occasion to unemployment, are
signed voluntarily, the unemploymentgenerated is not really involuntary
unemployment; and that since the contract maximized
expected profits, given the level of expected utility of theworker, since the contract
is, in this sense efficient, the marketequilibrium is efficient. While
the first question, whether theunemployment is voluntary or
involuntary, is mainly a matter of semantics, thesecond conclusion, that the market equilibrium ispareto efficient, is as we have noted
incorrect. There exist, in general,governmental interventions in the
market which can both increase profits andincrease the expected utility
of workers. (See Newbery andStiglitz, 1983, Arnott, }Iosios, and
Stiglitz, 19811.)(The result that ——evenwhen contractual arrangments
between parties are "locally efficient" ——thegeneral equilibrium is not Pareto efficient is moregeneral, and holds whenever there are
problems of moral hazard or adverse selection. SeeGreenwald and
Stiglitz (1983).)—57—
secondapproach,the efficiency wage models. These not only provide an
sicplanation of the existence of unemployment equilibrium in competitive
economies, they also provide part of the explanation of the observed
patternsof unemployment, of who becomes unemployed, and why
unemployment takes the form of layoffs rather than Work—sharing. They
provide an explanation for why differentfirms may pay similar labor
different wages. They explain wage stickiness1 both why firms may not
loose much if they fail to adjust their wages, and why, when they adjust
their wages optimally, they adjust them slowly.
The two theories are, of course, not mutally exclusive:
employer—employee relationships are frequently long term relationships;
what affects the quality of the labor force attracted to a finn, or the
effort which a worker exerts, is not just the wage at the moment, but
his life—time prospects.
The issues we have raised, concerning the nature of insurance, the
presence of asymmetric information, the limitations of enforcement
mechanisms, and restrictions on the degree of complexity of feasible
contracts, are all relevant in the design of the contract. They must
all be taken into account in explaining cyclical movements in wages,
hours, and employments. Our argument is that while simple efficiency
wage models can provide a plausible explanation of unemployment, simple
versions of the implicit contract model (with or without asymmetric
information) can do so only under highly restrictive and implausible
conditions, and have some important counterfactual implications.
We have just begun the exploration of the full implications of these
efficiency wage models. In the end, they may prove as unsatisfactory as
the earlier versions of the implicit contract theory; empirical—58—
predictionsof the theory maybeshown to be inconsistent with the
observed facts. But for now, they seemtoprovide the most fruitful
directionof research, in extending ow understanding ofwage
rigidities,this central element in the Keynesian legacy.—59—
Appendix A
Proof that layed—off workers are better off than retained workers,
under hypothesis of normality of leisure.
Weassume that firms provide supplementary unemployment benefits.
Theoptimalcontract maximizesprofits, subject to individual's
obtaining an expected utility of U, i.e. it maximizes
lEG h—y]f(s) +sf f(s)ds
A A'
subject to
f[U(y1h)f(s)ds +fU(S + b10)f(S)dS >(<) U
A A'
as a function of his income, y, and hours worked, h; and B(s) is the
productivity of an individual in state S. It is straightforward to show
that the solution to this entails
IJy aconstant;
individuals obtain perfect insurance, in the sense that their marginal


















Withoutloss of generality, we lety2 a y2.
Then from (8.1), h2 . h21, where
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1DdPi1 a (A+c)bAh1 1A(1bh101) +
ii
61Ddy1 —0 aAh1, +oi(Ab)01A[ah1+1] 'be1
do1














Direct calculations verify that
dh -(b+c) >(C) 0as b÷c >(() 0
dl 0(c+2b) +a
dCaab6 >(C) 0as abe XC) 0
dl o(c+2b) •a
where C -consumption.
Hence, at 0 =02






and AA(Oh—y) —firm'smeasure of relative risk aversion
-—ydlnh —incomeelasticity of labor supply
di
It immediately follows thatifA-O, the individual works more hours in
the good state than in the bad (h1>h,).It also immediately follows
that for states near each other, whether there is over or
underemployment simply depends on whether leisureis normal or inferior.
Moreover,if leisure is normal, and firms are risk neutral, one always
obtains either full employment or over employment, since h1 > Pt2—62—
Special cases: (a) Separability
Separability ensuresnormality, and dli1> 0.
do1
The condition for dS1 > 0 can now be written (at 01
02
do1
(1— a) v —A a v C 0
where
C —
UyyYworker's relative risk aversion
v tJhhh/[Jh —worker'selasticity of marginaldisabilityof effort
(b) U —U(y—v(h))
This utility function has theproperty that b÷c 0.
a +b0 =a—cev" ) 0
VI
butsince
b -u"/u'C 0, dh1/do >0, and if the two states are farenough apart, there will be full employment (the constraint
S 0 Is never
violated, since dS2 C 0).
do1—63—
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FIGURE la
Self—selection constraints satisfied in first best equilibrium.
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FIGURE lb
Self—selection constraint not satisfied in first best











Self—selection constraint not satisfied in first best
equilibrium: in the bad state, the firm would prefer
E1 to E2.











Contracts and E1 satisfy the self—selection constraints,
but there is underemployment in the bad state (to force









Contracts and E1 satisfy the self—selectionconstraint,
but there is overernployment inthe good state (to force
















With infinitely risk averse firms (and finitely riskaverse










Critical value of firm relative risk aversion (A), below
which the only equilibria entail over or full employment.
Increasing workers elasticity of marginal disutility of
labor and reducing the workers degree of risk aversion


















The self—selection constraints arenot binding,












If firmsarerisk averse and there is diminishing returns
(to the number of hours worked by each worker), then there




hIf individualshave utility functions of the form U=U(y—v(h))














w* is the efficiency wage. At w*, total labor costs






If monitoring is costly, the only equilibria entail
unemployment. A decrease in the demand for labor will









Consequences of differing wage productivity functions:some
groups will be fully employed (group 1), some partiallyemployed
(group 2) and some completely unemployed (group 3).
* * w
w2 wrelationship after increase
loyment benefits
Efficiency wage relationship before
increase in unemployment benefits
An increase in unemployment compensation may change







Two group case: an increase in unemployment compensation
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Two groupcase: an increase in unemployment compensation
lowers the wage and reduces unemployment.
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